National security vs. human rights: a game theoretic analysis of the tension between these objectives
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Publication:2029404
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2020.08.017zbMath1487.91093OpenAlexW3048766120MaRDI QIDQ2029404
Aniruddha Bagchi, Jomon Aliyas Paul
Publication date: 3 June 2021
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.08.017
Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical economics (91B99) History, political science (91F10)
Uses Software
Cites Work
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