A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities
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Publication:2029936
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2020.08.053zbMath1487.91086OpenAlexW3082504216MaRDI QIDQ2029936
Artem Sedakov, Han Qiao, Shou-Yang Wang
Publication date: 4 June 2021
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.08.053
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)
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