Preemptible queues with advance reservations: strategic behavior and revenue management

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.12.044zbMath1487.90215OpenAlexW3117044430MaRDI QIDQ2030299

Jonathan Chamberlain, David Starobinski, Eran Simhon

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.12.044

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryqueuingrevenue management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Uses Software

• Azure

Cites Work

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