Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
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Publication:2030716
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.018zbMath1487.91075OpenAlexW3010679335MaRDI QIDQ2030716
Publication date: 7 June 2021
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.018
Related Items (5)
Placement Optimization in Refugee Resettlement ⋮ New algorithm for checking Pareto optimality in bimatrix games ⋮ Computing welfare-maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods ⋮ Minimal envy and popular matchings ⋮ A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
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