The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2020.09.048zbMath1487.91049OpenAlexW3092084441MaRDI QIDQ2030728

Gian-Marco Kokott, Per Paulsen, Martin Bichler

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.09.048

zbMATH Keywords

lab experimentssplit-award auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

How auctioneers set reserve prices in procurement auctions

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
• Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time
• The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale
• Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Coordination in Split Award Auctions

This page was built for publication: The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions