How good is a two-party election game?

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2021.04.013zbMath1482.91080arXiv2001.05692OpenAlexW3159756901MaRDI QIDQ2031050

Po-An Chen, Chuang-Chieh Lin, Chi-Jen Lu

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.05692

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumprice of anarchyegoismtwo-party election game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• The \(K\)-armed dueling bandits problem
• Worst-case equilibria
• Voting almost maximizes social welfare despite limited communication
• Multi-battle contests
• Budget-constrained multi-battle contests: a new perspective and analysis
• The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
• Robust Price of Anarchy Bounds via LP and Fenchel Duality

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