Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.004zbMath1466.91109OpenAlexW3130704328MaRDI QIDQ2031171

Ritesh Jain

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.sinica.edu.tw/UpFiles/2013092817175327692/Seminar_PDF2013093010102890633/19-A002(all)new.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

implementationrationalizabilitysocial choice correspondences\(r\)-monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items

Continuous virtual implementation: complete information, Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization, Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms, Robust coalitional implementation

Cites Work

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