Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
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Publication:2031174
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.006zbMath1466.91045OpenAlexW3129813112MaRDI QIDQ2031174
Publication date: 8 June 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.006
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
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- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
- Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Polarization and Inefficient Policies
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