Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.006zbMath1466.91045OpenAlexW3129813112MaRDI QIDQ2031174

Takakazu Honryo, Péter Vida

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

strategic stabilityforward inductionmulti-sender signalingunprejudiced beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Competition in costly talk ⋮ Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly

Cites Work

• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. I: Theoretical preliminaries
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling
• Vagueness in multidimensional proposals
• On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Polarization and Inefficient Policies

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