Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.02.001zbMath1466.91069OpenAlexW3130729492MaRDI QIDQ2031178

Alexei Boulatov, Sergei Severinov

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designasymmetric budget constraintsoptimal and efficient mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Optimal dynamic multi-keyword bidding policy of an advertiser in search-based advertising ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction

Cites Work

• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
• Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents
• High bids and broke winners

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