Position auctions with multi-unit demands
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2031180
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.002zbMath1466.91137OpenAlexW3137503149MaRDI QIDQ2031180
Publication date: 8 June 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.002
Cites Work
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
- Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
- Matching through position auctions
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions
- Pricing in position auctions and online advertising
- Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
- Position Auctions with Consumer Search
- Dynamic Position Auctions with Consumer Search
- Incentives in Teams
- Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
This page was built for publication: Position auctions with multi-unit demands
