Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.003zbMath1466.91029OpenAlexW3147520375MaRDI QIDQ2031182

Guillaume Cheikbossian

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitypublic goodsaltruismgroup contestindirect evolutionary approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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