Level-k reasoning in school choice
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Publication:2031184
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.007zbMath1466.91212OpenAlexW3155754332MaRDI QIDQ2031184
Publication date: 8 June 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.007
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Cites Work
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