Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.008zbMath1466.91105OpenAlexW3152847870MaRDI QIDQ2031185

Nikolas Tsakas, Dimitrios Xefteris

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/10-19.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentplurality ruleinformation aggregationrunoff votingCondorcet jury theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
• Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• The calculus of ethical voting
• Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Information aggregation with runoff voting
• Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
• Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
• One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
• Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
• Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• Quantal Response Equilibrium

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