Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.03.010zbMath1466.91158OpenAlexW3157877664MaRDI QIDQ2031190

Henrique Castro-Pires, Humberto Moreira

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardadverse selectionlimited liabilitynon-responsivenesspooling contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (1)

Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard

Cites Work

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• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
• Optimal Auction Design
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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