Bargains, price signaling, and efficiency in markets with asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.001zbMath1466.91136OpenAlexW3156718989MaRDI QIDQ2031194

Mark Schneider, Daniel Graydon Stephenson

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

experimentasymmetric informationprice signalling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Cites Work

• Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
• Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly
• Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable?
• Prices, Product Qualities and Asymmetric Information: The Competitive Case
• Prices as Signals of Product Quality
• Prices and Qualities in Markets with Costly Information
• Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion
• Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment