Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.006zbMath1466.91211OpenAlexW3158242103MaRDI QIDQ2031196

Akira Okada

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitydecentralized marketmany-to-one matchingsequential bargainingprotocol-free equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Signaling, screening, and core stability

Cites Work

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