Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
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Publication:2031197
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.007zbMath1466.91075OpenAlexW3157301608MaRDI QIDQ2031197
Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi, Hannu Vartiainen
Publication date: 8 June 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.007
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