On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets
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Publication:2032294
DOI10.1007/s00224-020-09984-7zbMath1466.91121OpenAlexW3034890902MaRDI QIDQ2032294
Orestis A. Telelis, Evangelos Markakis, Apostolos Ntokos
Publication date: 11 June 2021
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-020-09984-7
additiveapproximationsubmodularbudgetrevenue maximizationvaluation functionsubadditiveenvy-free outcomesingle-minded
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Cites Work
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