Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
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Publication:2034798
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.11.002zbMath1466.91107OpenAlexW3109339351MaRDI QIDQ2034798
Publication date: 23 June 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.11.002
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Cites Work
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