Persuasion under costly learning

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.11.007zbMath1466.91046OpenAlexW2903143146MaRDI QIDQ2034801

Dong Wei

Publication date: 23 June 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

persuasionrational inattentioninformation designcostly information processing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Optimal attention management: a tractable framework ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning

Cites Work

• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Private Bayesian persuasion

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