A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
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Publication:2034808
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.102458zbMath1466.91208OpenAlexW3111139807MaRDI QIDQ2034808
Publication date: 23 June 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.102458
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