Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109814zbMath1467.91061OpenAlexW3136312674MaRDI QIDQ2036905

Fang Zhao, Yajing Chen, Yang Zhang, Zhen-Hua Jiao

Publication date: 30 June 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109814

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyefficiencyacyclicitymulti-unit demandrespecting priority improvement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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