On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109823zbMath1467.91059OpenAlexW3138784914MaRDI QIDQ2036920

Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 30 June 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109823

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsprivate informationoutsourcingmake-or-buy decisionproperty rights approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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