Coalitional efficient profit-sharing

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109875zbMath1467.91062OpenAlexW3159144853MaRDI QIDQ2036964

Kohei Nitta, Miguel Vargas, Ruben Juarez

Publication date: 30 June 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109875

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencystrong Nash implementationnon-bossyprofit-sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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• Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
• Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture
• Sharing sequential values in a network
• Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
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• Coalitional manipulation on networks
• Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences

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