Supervisory information and loss aversion

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.109908zbMath1467.91077OpenAlexW3163729720MaRDI QIDQ2036997

Sungho Yun, Dongsoo Shin

Publication date: 30 June 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109908

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversioncorruptionsupervisory information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*

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