Motives and implementation with rights structures

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109913zbMath1467.91023OpenAlexW3161680084MaRDI QIDQ2037002

Foivos Savva

Publication date: 30 June 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109913

zbMATH Keywords

implementationpartial honestysocial responsibilitymotiverights structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
• Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
• Implementation via rights structures
• A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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