Partial information disclosure in a contest

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.109915zbMath1467.91055OpenAlexW3138062992MaRDI QIDQ2037004

Derek J. Clark, Tapas Kundu

Publication date: 30 June 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109915

zbMATH Keywords

contestBayesian persuasioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests

Cites Work

• Who gains from information asymmetry?

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