Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-57602-8_25zbMath1481.91101OpenAlexW3047692151MaRDI QIDQ2039672

Li Ning, Guichen Gao, Xinxin Han, Hing-Fung Ting, Yong Zhang

Publication date: 5 July 2021

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57602-8_25

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items

Principal-agent problem under the linear contract

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Combinatorial agency
• Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems
• Sample average approximation for the continuous type principal-agent problem
• Consistency between principal and agent with differing time horizons: computing incentives under risk
• Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
• Contracting under uncertainty: a principal-agent model with ambiguity averse parties
• A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
• Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems