The equal-surplus Shapley value for chance-constrained games on finite sample spaces

DOI10.1007/s00186-021-00738-wzbMath1470.91026OpenAlexW3128367375MaRDI QIDQ2040436

Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, Issofa Moyouwou, Donald Nganmegni Njoya

Publication date: 14 July 2021

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-021-00738-w

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryequal surplusfinite sample spacesrandom coalitional payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Spaces of games (91A70)

Cites Work

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• Coalitional and Chance-Constrained Solutions ton-Person Games. I: The Prior Satisficing Nucleolus
• Coalitional and Chance-Constrained Solutions to n-Person Games, II: Two-Stage Solutions
• CONVEXITY IN STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE SITUATIONS

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