The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00750-0zbMath1468.91076OpenAlexW3119422925MaRDI QIDQ2041072

Marco Serena

Publication date: 15 July 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00750-0

zbMATH Keywords

productivityinformationprocrastinationdeadline

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines
• Deadlines and distractions
• Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown
• Incentives for Procrastinators
• Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• Reputational Bargaining and Deadlines

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