Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
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Publication:2041075
DOI10.1007/s00182-021-00754-4zbMath1468.91066OpenAlexW3121212546MaRDI QIDQ2041075
Publication date: 15 July 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00754-4
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