Multi-prize contests with expectation-based loss-averse players

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.109921zbMath1468.91009OpenAlexW3165280651MaRDI QIDQ2043112

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 22 July 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109921

zbMATH Keywords

contest designreference-dependent preferencesprize allocationexpectation-based loss aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Expectations-based loss aversion in contests

Cites Work

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• The optimal multi-stage contest
• Fairness and desert in tournaments
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
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• Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
• Centralized versus decentralized contests with risk-averse players
• Expectation-based loss aversion and rank-order tournaments
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• Auctions with loss‐averse bidders

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