Bidding frictions in ascending auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2019.11.009OpenAlexW3092606554MaRDI QIDQ2043241

Robert A. Miller, Joachim R. Groeger, Aaron Barkley

Publication date: 30 July 2021

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2019.11.009

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesauctionsdominanceinferencejump bids

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistics (62-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bounds for best response functions in binary games
• Nonparametric estimation of the measurement error model using multiple indicators.
• Subsampling
• Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
• Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions
• On some characterization of probability distributions in Hilbert spaces
• Identification and Inference in Ascending Auctions With Correlated Private Values
• The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of European Central Bank Auctions for Short-Term Funds
• Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity
• Jump Bidding Strategies in Internet Auctions
• Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Nonparametric testing of closeness between two unknown distribution functions
• Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
• An empirical model of non-equilibrium behavior in games
• Identification of time and risk preferences in buy price auctions
• Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets
• COMPARING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
• Revision Games
• Costly Signalling in Auctions
• Identification of Standard Auction Models

This page was built for publication: Bidding frictions in ascending auctions