Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

DOI10.1007/S10203-021-00326-XzbMath1470.91129OpenAlexW3044683767MaRDI QIDQ2044827

Marco Guerrazzi

Publication date: 10 August 2021

Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-021-00326-x

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controllocal dynamicswage-employment bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Labor markets (91B39)

Related Items (1)

The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts

Cites Work

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• Bargaining solutions at work: qualitative differences in policy implications
• An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players
• The Bargaining Problem
• Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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