Breaking ties in collective decision-making
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Publication:2044831
DOI10.1007/s10203-020-00294-8OpenAlexW3080131284MaRDI QIDQ2044831
Michele Gori, Daniela Bubboloni
Publication date: 10 August 2021
Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.10165
neutralityanonymitytie-breaking ruleresolutenessmultiwinner social choice correspondencesocial preference correspondence
Related Items (2)
Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking
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