The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105228zbMath1476.91055OpenAlexW3133384207MaRDI QIDQ2044979

Akaki Mamageishvili, Oriol Tejada, Hans Gersbach

Publication date: 11 August 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105228

zbMATH Keywords

electionsturnoutprivate valuepivotal votingreferenda

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

Large elections and interim turnout ⋮ Representative Committees of Peers ⋮ Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers

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