Credit attribution and collaborative work

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105264zbMath1470.91138OpenAlexW3157978066MaRDI QIDQ2044983

Saltuk Ozerturk, Hüseyin Yıldırım

Publication date: 11 August 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ftp1.economics.smu.edu/WorkingPapers/2019/OZERTURK/OZERTURK-2019-11.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

creditcollaborationteamworkproject difficultysolo work

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

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• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Aggregate comparative statics
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Projects and Team Dynamics
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Uncertainty‐driven cooperation

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