Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
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Publication:2044997
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105283zbMath1470.91048OpenAlexW3164431225MaRDI QIDQ2044997
Pierpaolo Battigalli, Nicodemo De Vito
Publication date: 11 August 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:629
Related Items (5)
Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ Choice structures in games ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games ⋮ Complete Conditional Type Structures (Extended Abstract)
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