Protecting elections by recounting ballots
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Publication:2046043
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2020.103401OpenAlexW2966333273MaRDI QIDQ2046043
Svetlana Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich, Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Publication date: 16 August 2021
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.07071
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (3)
A Parameterized Perspective on Attacking and Defending Elections ⋮ Isomorphic Distances Among Elections ⋮ Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games
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