Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
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Publication:2046152
DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09781-1zbMath1470.91028OpenAlexW3102048744MaRDI QIDQ2046152
Yukihiko Funaki, Takumi Kongo, Koji Yokote
Publication date: 17 August 2021
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09781-1
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