Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions

DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09790-0zbMath1470.91103OpenAlexW3119781662MaRDI QIDQ2046171

Jianxin Yi

Publication date: 17 August 2021

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09790-0

zbMATH Keywords

abstentionparticipationmechanismsNash implementationminimal participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
• A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
• Is abstention an escape from Arrow's theorem?
• Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Ex post implementation
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
• Time and Nash implementation
• Abstention as an escape from arrow's theorem
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Voluntary implementation
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms

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