The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model

DOI10.1007/S10957-021-01861-8zbMath1470.91146arXiv2005.05147OpenAlexW3157763648MaRDI QIDQ2046544

Jessica Martin

Publication date: 18 August 2021

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.05147

zbMATH Keywords

limited liabilityrisk-sharingprincipal-agent problemsoptimization on Hilbert spaces

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Existence of optimal solutions to problems involving randomness (49J55) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Contract theory in continuous-time models
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Functional analysis, Sobolev spaces and partial differential equations
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• Convex functional analysis
• Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
• Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market
• Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity

This page was built for publication: The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model