On the structural stability of values for cooperative games

DOI10.1007/s10957-021-01863-6zbMath1470.91023OpenAlexW3158848575MaRDI QIDQ2046545

Xianghui Li, Yang Li

Publication date: 18 August 2021

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-021-01863-6

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoalition formationstrong equilibriumlevel structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

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