A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
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Publication:2046575
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.006zbMath1470.91034OpenAlexW3187511339MaRDI QIDQ2046575
Publication date: 25 August 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.006
local interactionsstochastic stabilityobservation errorsaction errorsiterative elimination of dominated strategies
2-person games (91A05) Stochastic stability in control theory (93E15) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)
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