Fiscal federalism in a monetary union: the no-cooperation pitfall

DOI10.1007/s11079-019-09571-5zbMath1470.91180OpenAlexW3012367855MaRDI QIDQ2046999

Hubert Kempf

Publication date: 19 August 2021

Published in: Open Economies Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-019-09571-5

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationmonetary unionfiscal federalismpolicymix

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (1)

Fiscal stabilization in the United States: lessons for monetary unions

Cites Work

• Linear-quadratic approximation of optimal policy problems
• Macroeconomic policy interaction under EMU: a dynamic game approach
• Monetary and Fiscal policy design in the EMU: An overview
• Fiscal policy and macroeconomic stabilizations: what are the gains from cooperation?
• On the logic of fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union
• Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining With Outside Options

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