Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.05.001zbMath1470.91131arXiv1912.03607OpenAlexW3165217732MaRDI QIDQ2049458

Jingfeng Lu, Zongwei Lu, Christian Riis

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.03607

zbMATH Keywords

collusionsecond-price auctionbribemultidimensional signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Speculation in procurement auctions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bribing in first-price auctions
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
• Bidding collusion without passive updating
• Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
• Bidder collusion
• Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions
• Bribing in second-price auctions
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

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