An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.005zbMath1470.91191OpenAlexW3164847843MaRDI QIDQ2049465

Gustavo Saraiva

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingstrategy-proofnesslarge markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Incentive ratio: a game theoretical analysis of market equilibria

Cites Work

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• Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Strategy-proofness in the Large
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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