Regime change games with an active defender
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Publication:2049469
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.008zbMath1470.91055OpenAlexW3169208947MaRDI QIDQ2049469
Ole Jann, Christoph Schottmüller
Publication date: 25 August 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.008
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