Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011zbMath1470.91125OpenAlexW2885492362MaRDI QIDQ2049473

Claudia Cerrone, Yoan Hermstrüwer, Pedro Robalo

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0001-34B6-7

zbMATH Keywords

collusionprocurement auctionssanctionsdebarment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• hroot

Cites Work

• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Collusion through communication in auctions
• The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions