How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field
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Publication:2049478
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.010zbMath1470.91190OpenAlexW3122646373MaRDI QIDQ2049478
Bettina Klaus, Dorothea Kübler, Christian Basteck
Publication date: 25 August 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.unil.ch/de/files/live/sites/de/files/working-papers/19.09.pdf
experimentmarket designlotteriesschool choiceimmediate acceptance mechanismdeferred acceptance mechanism
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Cognitive ability and games of school choice
- Self-selection in school choice
- Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms
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